Event Date: 27th September 2025
Event brief description
On the sixth day of his Master class, Justice Lalit highlighted the Supreme Court’s insistence in the Indra Sawhney case that reservation benefits must reach the truly disadvantaged. The “creamy layer” concept, introduced for OBCs, now extends to SC/ST as per recent Supreme Court directions. Current creamy layer criteria include:
Justice Lalit suggested ideal government parameters for exclusion should include:
Event Detailed Description
On Sixth day of his Master Class, Justice Lalit articulated that for a class to be classified as backward (and thus eligible under Article 15(4) or 16(4)), it should share similar disadvantages (social, educational, economic) as SC/ST groups. Parameters for such classification should include:
Justice U.U. Lalit distinguished between Article 15(4) and Article 16(4) of the Indian Constitution by clarifying their respective scopes and aims within the domain of affirmative action. Article 15(4) empowers the State to create special provisions for the advancement of “socially and educationally backward classes” in educational institutions, making it a broad constitutional tool for promoting inclusion in public institutions. In contrast, Article 16(4) specifically addresses equality of opportunity in public employment by allowing the State to reserve posts for “backward classes not adequately represented” in government services, highlighting its targeted use for employment. Importantly, both articles are enabling provisions, not mandatory directives the government carries the responsibility to decide when and how these forms of reservation are justifiably implemented. If reservation policies are excessive or improperly framed, they can be challenged as unconstitutional.
In Mr. Balaji v. State of Mysore (1962), the Supreme Court established a cap of 50% on reservations, ruling that excessive reservation violates the Constitution. The judgment advocated for scientific, objective identification criteria for backward classes and cautioned against reverse discrimination that may arise from unchecked affirmative action.
Justice Lalit also referenced Marri Chandra Shekhar Rao v. Dean, Seth G.S. Medical College, where the Supreme Court held that Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe status is state-specific, meaning reservation benefits are available only in the state of origin and do not transfer upon migration. In Bir Singh v. Delhi, the Supreme Court maintained that SC/ST status does not transfer on migration to another state; however, a unique exception exists in the NCT of Delhi, where those recognized as SC/ST in any Indian state can claim reservation benefits. In State of Maharashtra v. Milind, the principle was affirmed that only castes specified by Presidential notification under Articles 341 and 342 qualify as SC/ST for reservation purposes and that states cannot expand such lists independently.
Articles 341 and 342 empower the President of India to specify, by notification, which castes are Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for particular states, with the power to amend lists resting solely with Parliament. Article 342A similarly provides the constitutional basis for defining Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (OBC) for reservation.
This nuanced constitutional framework, as illustrated in Justice Lalit’s remarks, strives to balance the advancement of disadvantaged groups with the principles of equality, federalism, and legal certainty.
Department Name – School of Law
Event Outcome
Justice Lalit’s lecture provided a nuanced account of affirmative action’s constitutional journey from drafting and legislative intent to contemporary case law and policy challenges. It outlined the analytical and empirical rigor required to determine backwardness and creamy layer exclusion, the criteria for reservation eligibility, and the judicial safeguards against excesses. The discourse is pivotal for understanding affirmative action’s future direction under India’s constitutional morality.