Day 14: “From Constituent Assembly to Constitutional Morality: The Journey of Affirmative Actions in India” by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh Lalit, Former Chief Justice of India

Event Date: 17th December 2025

Event brief description

Justice U.U. Lalit, in his lecture talked about the contemporary constitutional debate on equality, race, and education through the contrasting judicial philosophies of Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Sonia Sotomayor of the United States Supreme Court, particularly as reflected in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College (2023). Drawing from comparative constitutional jurisprudence, the discussion highlighted how differing interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment shape approaches to affirmative action.

Justice Thomas, speaking from personal experience of economic and social disadvantage, acknowledged the reality of hardship faced by historically marginalized communities. However, he rejected race-based remedies, advocating a colour-blind interpretation of the Constitution. According to his view, racial classifications—even when intended to benefit disadvantaged groups—undermine individual dignity and perpetuate stereotypes, and equality must be achieved through race-neutral means.

In contrast, Justice Sotomayor emphasized the persistent legacy of racial discrimination in American society, particularly in education. She argued that ignoring race fails to address structural inequalities between White and Black Americans and risks entrenching historical disadvantage. Her approach reflects a substantive conception of equality, where limited consideration of race may be constitutionally permissible to achieve genuine equal opportunity.

The lecture situated this debate within broader constitutional theory, illustrating the tension between formal equality and substantive equality in modern constitutional adjudication.

Event Detailed Description

Justice U.U. Lalit, in his discussion on equality and affirmative action, explored the evolving meaning of equality in constitutional law through the sharply contrasting judicial perspectives of Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Sonia Sotomayor, as articulated in the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College (2023). The discussion placed these views within the broader framework of comparative constitutional jurisprudence, drawing parallels with Indian constitutional principles under Article 14.

Justice Clarence Thomas’s opinion reflects a deeply personal yet firmly principled stance. While candidly acknowledging that he was “painfully aware” of economic and social disadvantage in his own life, Justice Thomas rejected the use of race as a constitutional tool for remedying inequality. He argued that the Equal Protection Clause embodies a color-blind Constitution, which prohibits the State from classifying individuals on the basis of race, irrespective of intent. According to him, race-based affirmative action risks reinforcing racial stereotypes and undermining individual merit, thereby perpetuating the very divisions it seeks to eliminate. He emphasized that social and economic disadvantage should be addressed through race-neutral mechanisms, such as poverty-based criteria, rather than racial classifications.

In stark contrast, Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s dissent foregrounded the enduring realities of racial discrimination, particularly in the field of education. She underscored that the historical divide between White and Black Americans has not been erased and continues to shape access to educational opportunities. Justice Sotomayor rejected the notion that constitutional equality can be achieved by simply ignoring race. In her view, a purely formal or color-blind approach fails to account for systemic and structural inequalities and risks entrenching existing disparities. She defended the limited and contextual use of race as a legitimate means of achieving substantive equality and fulfilling the transformative promise of the Equal Protection Clause.

The lecture highlighted that this disagreement reflects a deeper constitutional tension between two competing conceptions of equality: formal equality, which demands identical treatment regardless of context, and substantive equality, which permits differential treatment to remedy historical disadvantage. The majority opinion in Students for Fair Admissions ultimately endorsed Justice Thomas’s colour-blind approach, marking a decisive shift in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence away from the reasoning adopted in Grutter v. Bollinger.

By situating this debate alongside Indian constitutional experience—where affirmative action is explicitly permitted to address historical discrimination—the lecture illustrated how constitutional systems respond differently to inequality while grappling with the same foundational question: whether equality is best achieved by ignoring differences or by acknowledging them to secure real justice.

Department Name – School of Law

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