Day 15: “From Constituent Assembly to Constitutional Morality: The Journey of Affirmative Actions in India” by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh Lalit, Former Chief Justice of India

Event Date: 09th January 2026

Event brief description

Justice U.U. Lalit, in his lecture, examined the evolving constitutional discourse on equality and discrimination through a comparative analysis of Canadian constitutional jurisprudence under Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Drawing extensively from landmark case law discussed in the attached material, the lecture traced the shift from a formal equality framework to a more nuanced doctrine of substantive equality.

The discussion began with R v. Kapp (2008), where the Supreme Court of Canada upheld an Aboriginal-only fishing licence scheme, holding that ameliorative programs aimed at disadvantaged groups do not violate equality rights. Justice Lalit highlighted how Section 15(2) operates as a constitutional shield for affirmative action, recognizing historical disadvantage rather than insisting on identical treatment. The lecture then moved to Canadian National Railway Co. v. Canada (1987), which laid the foundation for the doctrine of adverse-effect and systemic discrimination, emphasizing that discriminatory intent is not a prerequisite for establishing inequality. This principle was further developed in Fraser v. Canada (2020), where a facially neutral pension scheme was struck down for having a disproportionate adverse impact on women, reinforcing the importance of examining real-world effects.

Through these cases, Justice Lalit illustrated the constitutional tension between neutrality and remediation, underscoring that modern equality jurisprudence prioritizes context, impact, and structural disadvantage over rigid formalism.

Event Detailed Description

Justice U.U. Lalit, in his detailed lecture on equality and affirmative action, examined the constitutional meaning of equality through comparative constitutional jurisprudence, with particular emphasis on Canadian equality doctrine under Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Drawing from the cases discussed in the attached material, the lecture traced how courts have moved from a narrow, formal understanding of equality to a more context-sensitive and impact-based approach that recognizes systemic disadvantage.

The lecture began with Canadian National Railway Co. v. Canada (Human Rights Commission) (1987), which marked a foundational moment in equality jurisprudence. Justice Lalit explained how the Court rejected an intent-based model of discrimination and recognized systemic and adverse-effect discrimination, holding that facially neutral employment policies may nonetheless perpetuate inequality. This case was presented as a critical turning point, establishing that equality analysis must focus on outcomes and institutional practices rather than merely on formal neutrality.

The discussion then turned to R v. Kapp (2008), a seminal decision on affirmative action. Justice Lalit highlighted how the Supreme Court of Canada upheld a government program granting exclusive fishing rights to Aboriginal communities, ruling that it did not violate equality rights. The Court interpreted Section 15(2) as an independent constitutional guarantee protecting ameliorative measures aimed at improving the conditions of historically disadvantaged groups. This approach, the lecture noted, affirms that differential treatment may be constitutionally legitimate when its purpose is remedial rather than exclusionary.

Building on these principles, the lecture examined Fraser v. Canada (2020), which represents the contemporary articulation of substantive equality. Justice Lalit explained how a facially neutral pension scheme for RCMP employees was struck down because it had a disproportionate adverse impact on women, particularly those balancing employment and caregiving responsibilities. The Court emphasized that choice and neutrality cannot shield the State from scrutiny when policies reinforce existing gendered patterns of disadvantage.

Through these cases, Justice Lalit illustrated a consistent constitutional theme: equality is not achieved by identical treatment alone. Rather, it requires attention to context, historical disadvantage, and real-world effects. The lecture highlighted the inherent tension between formal equality, which prioritizes sameness of treatment, and substantive equality, which permits differential treatment to dismantle structural barriers.

By situating Canadian jurisprudence alongside Indian constitutional principles under Articles 14 and 15, the lecture underscored how constitutional systems grapple with the same foundational question—whether equality is best served through neutrality or through targeted remedial measures. Justice Lalit concluded that modern constitutional adjudication increasingly recognizes that true equality demands sensitivity to difference, not its denial, if constitutional promises of justice and dignity are to be meaningfully fulfilled.

Department Name – School of Law

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